Counterinsurgency and College

I wrote a paper. It earned 98 out of 100 points. It's ok, not the best I could have done, but still, some great reading in order to write it.

RESEARCH PAPER:
GENERAL PETRAEUS RE-INTRODUCES COUNTERINSURGENCY TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

FEBRUARY 22, 2008

General David H. Petraeus has recently taken the reigns of command in the United States military efforts in Iraq, doing so amid a storm of accusations that the Bush administration, and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in particular, bungled the aftermath of the March, 2003, invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq. Petreaus, with experience studying and later practicing counterinsurgency, seemed to be the right man at the right time to direct a change in strategy in Iraq. Abandoning the previous strategy of turning over control of areas to Iraqi Security Forces and pulling back into large Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s) and turning to counterinsurgency requires a thorough knowledge of the principles and concepts needed to win against fanatical fighters who easily blend into the local population, have no compunction about who they hurt or kill, and whose primary aim is to cause chaos and confusion in order to drain the American public’s support for the war and thus gain the strategic victory, though certainly not a tactical one.

This method had proven itself as a bone fide means of controlling the world’s only superpower: in Vietnam, and again when the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan leaving a power vacuum that the Taliban easily filled, and Al Qaeda felt it understood well the lessons learned there. Again and again this lesson was reinforced: when the 1991 bombing of the World Trade Center was treated as a criminal act instead of the act of war it was intended to be; when the United States abruptly pulled out of Somalia in 1993 after loosing eighteen Rangers in a failed raid; the international indignation when the U.S. bombed an aspirin factory in Africa; and on and on. General Petraeus, it was thought, would be the man to change that trend and show the world, particularly current and would-be terrorists that America had finally learned the lesson, too, and would not run from this fight.

Counterinsurgency, or COIN as it now referred to in military circles, has another name these days, especially in America’s media: “The Petraeus doctrine.”1 Changing the strategy being used in Iraq from the previous one of “whack-a-mole” and consolidation of forces on huge FOB’s to a strategy based firmly in counterinsurgency doctrine became General David Petraeus’ mandate when he took command of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) February 10th, 2007. This wasn’t his first time in Iraq. He commanded the 101st Airborne Division during the invasion in 2003 and during the first several months of the occupation phase. It was during this period that his Screaming Eagles killed Saddam Hussein’s sons, chased Baathists and began reconstruction and community public works projects.2
This also isn’t the first time Petraeus has spent time thinking about counterinsurgency. Graduating from the US Military Academy too late to go to Vietnam, he wasn’t too late to gather enough information about the lessons learned during that difficult conflict.3 He noted that there were “misgivings” in the American military establishment over the willingness of future politicians to “stay the course” in fighting an insurgency, not whether or not American troops were capable, but in whether or not the American public could be convinced that staying was worth the price. Petraeus recognized that there were elements that doubted whether the US military could develop forces necessary to defeat an insurgency. He quotes one officer who said,

“I submit that the U.S. Army does not have the mind-set for combat operations where the key terrain is the mind, not the high ground. We do not take the time to understand the nature of the society in which we are fighting, the government we are supporting or the enemy we are fighting.”4

There were those that understood that a different kind of unit needed to be created and trained to specifically fight insurgents. President Kennedy recognized the potential of the US Army’s Special Forces in this area, deploying them to Vietnam in 1957.5 It is no secret, as the quote above shows, there was still doubt about the actual capabilities of Special Forces and of the entire military to handle counterinsurgency operations. What is heartening, though, in this current conflict, the War on Terrorism, is that the lessons of the past are not being ignored, rather studied in an attempt to avoid repeating them.6 It should also be noted that along with Special Forces, other types of units grew out of the post-World War II, Korea and Vietnam experiences, such as Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations units, both of which joined Special Forces in becoming their own branches, thus gaining the recognition that their contributions to the battlefield warranted having Soldiers that were specially and specifically trained for these types of missions.

General Petraeus’ assignment prior to taking command of MNF-I was as the commanding general of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, where he oversaw the rewriting of the Army’s and Marine Corps’ Counterinsurgency Field Manual, FM 3-24. The opening paragraph of the introduction of the manual seems to point directly at Petraeus’ observations of the after-effects of Vietnam,

“The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military superiority. This capability has pushed its enemies to fight U.S. forces unconventionally, mixing modern technology with ancient techniques of insurgency and terrorism. Most enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do not limit themselves to purely military means. They know that they cannot compete with U.S. forces on those terms. Instead, they try to exhaust U.S. national will, aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support.”7

What is remarkable about this manual is that it addresses not only the military aspects of fighting an insurgency, but discusses the political, economic and social or cultural factors that have much more influence on the outcome of such a protracted fight. It is interesting that the authors researched insurgent/counterinsurgent battles throughout recorded history, but felt that the most appropriate lessons would be drawn from those in the 20th Century and onward.8 Thus we now see a departure for conventional forces in that a paradigm has emerged, that of approaching counterinsurgency operations as important as, or more so depending on the scenario, maneuver operations. In other words, no longer is the idea that understanding maneuver warfare is enough and you can scheme your way though “the little stuff” (i.e. post-high intensity conflict) but that good leaders, indeed all troops to varying degrees, need an understanding of “Operations Other Than War” as well.9 The idea that the “strategic corporal” and “strategic lieutenant” will have as much if not more influence on the overall outcome of counterinsurgency operations sounds new, but is really that old idea that “battles are sometimes won by generals; wars are nearly always won by sergeants and privates.”10

Petraeus’ understanding of counterinsurgency and how he would apply it effectively as the MNF-I Commander was primarily honed during the time he spent in Mosul, still as the 101st Airborne Division’s Commanding General where he directed the “Clear and Hold” strategy to rid the city and surrounding area of insurgents. The concept requires the methodical clearance of an area of insurgents and their caches, then to “hold” the area with security forces, whether with Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces, or a combination of the two, and immediately commence economic- and infrastructure-building projects along with humanitarian aid and lending legitimacy to the local governmental officials and agencies. General Petraeus did it well in Mosul and as MNF-I Commander took as a top advisor another commander that performed similarly well in Tal’ Afar, Colonel H. R. McMasters. Petraeus’ point is that, “if you are going to secure the population, if that’s job one, then you have to live with the population that you are going to secure.”11 This is why in Baghdad there are now dozens of patrol bases, Joint Security Stations and Combat OutPosts with Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces located throughout the city.

It is with this experience in mind that General Petraeus has engineered “The Surge”, the placement of four additional brigades in and around Baghdad, in an attempt to replicate his previous success in Mosul. Added to the American military brigades, the Iraqi Army has “surged” a large number of additional forces to the Baghdad area and conducts many of the security operations there unaided and independent of Coalition Forces. This is encouraging, as it shows that one of the key steps to Iraq overcoming the insurgency and establishing a safe and secure environment is well on its way. However, this is only part of the strategy. While the military focuses on rooting out insurgents and providing security for the citizens of Baghdad, the Iraqi national government is expected to take advantage of those conditions to work on policies that will ensure the people are drawn to support the government rather than the insurgents.12 This comes right out of the COIN field manual, chapter 2, “Unity of Effort: Integrating Civilian and Military Activities,” particularly the note that the military must fill the gap created with civil agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) cannot conduct the economic, social and political programs that will get its society out of war and into a peaceful coexistence with itself and its neighbors.13

There those, however, that remain doubtful as to General Petraeus’ ability to lead the counterinsurgency to a successful conclusion. Not because they doubt his abilities, but because they feel that President Bush will thwart his attempt. They point to past policy decisions such as disbanding the former Iraqi Army, the de-Baathification of the civil service among other things that appear to be in direct contradiction to the military’s new COIN manual, using the manual’s “Do’s and Don’t’s” lists to check off the administration’s handling of the war until then.14 These same critics give the COIN manual high marks for pointing out the complexities of fighting a counterinsurgency but still question whether Petraeus will be given the latitude to conduct the mission as his experience, doctrine and knowledge will guide him. The fact that Petraeus’ strategy sounded similar to the previous “whack-a-mole” or “squeeze the balloon” themes that chased insurgents out of an area only to allow them to return or to set up operations in a new area also caused doubts. In fact, his strategy seemed similar only in that it had numerous combat operations engaged simultaneously, but what differed is that when, in previous strategies, the enemy was engaged and the battle won, Coalition and Iraqi Forces would withdraw to the safety of their FOB’s while the enemy regrouped elsewhere and planned further attacks, bombings and terroristic activities. Petraeus wouldn’t allow them to rest, instead continuing to pursue the insurgents until they were captured or dead, denying them time to regroup or find sanctuary.

General Petraeus himself has stated that it is time that may be the mission’s worst enemy.15 He believes there is the will to succeed and not just by the Americans but by the Iraqis, from the top national leadership down to the common Iraqi who is glad to be rid of Saddam Hussein’s regime. There has been a shift of focus from security towards building the economy of Iraq, especially in areas where security has greatly improved and Iraqis begin to reclaim their homes, businesses and everyday lives. In order to maintain that progress and thus bolster security which will again allow further opportunities for improvement, General Petraeus is pushing the revitalization of markets, refurbishing and rebuilding of schools and the re-establishment of critical civil services in order to capitalize on the security successes of the Surge brigades.16 He sees signs of progress on the political front as well. Important legislation and opposition to insurgents are advancing but Petraeus maintains that for the country to create a secure political, economic and social environment, problems “must be resolved by Iraqis in an Iraqi way.”17

Other experiences in college helped the general in Iraq as well. He drew on that learning when in Mosul he realized that the folks there were heading for trouble even though the insurgents were on the run. As civilians got jobs and pay, he saw that they had relatively few goods to purchase, a sure sign that inflation and a whole host of problems were on the way. The Iraqis convinced him to open the border with Syria in order to trade and avoid severe economic problems in the area. Of course, that in itself did not make Mosul terrorist-free, but that along with the improved security environment created conditions that allowed local leaders to start rebuilding.

The leadership and judgment of General Petraeus is being used in more ways that just leading the counterinsurgency in Iraq. According to Ed Morrissey, “Senior leadership understands now that they need to produce an entire generation of Petraeuses.”18 In order to do so, the Pentagon recalled Petraeus to Washington, D.C., in order to advise the board of generals that selected forty colonels for promotion to brigadier general. While he did not vote on the selections, his involvement was meant to send a signal to junior officers that the top brass knows that a fundamental shift in military thinking had to occur and that they “got it.”

While insurgents and counterinsurgents have been battling each other through the ages, many in modern times failed to understand the nature of such conflict. Whether through ignorance or the deliberate mislabeling of terrorist activities, it has only been since September 11, 2001, that the world has taken notice of terrorists as a force worth fighting with military force rather than law enforcement agencies. We’ve even seen a slight redefining of the term “insurgency” since Al Qaeda’s goals don’t match the traditional definition.

The War in Iraq was initiated because Saddam Hussein tricked the world, including his own generals, into believing that he had so-called “weapons of mass descruction” (WMDs).19 The threat he posed, or more accurately that he portrayed himself to portray, after 9/11 was not a threat that President Bush was willing to risk, especially given the eleven-year track record of Saddam ignoring United Nations resolutions and violating the “Oil For Food” Program for his personal benefit. Whether one believes that invasion was warranted or not became immaterial once the invasion occurred. America then assumed the responsibility of helping Iraqis sort out how to best reconstitute their government and protect their own citizens. Al Qaeda seized the opportunity during this period of chaos to attempt to take power, drive the United States military and her allies out of the country and use it to establish a radical state in which terror reigned and terrorists could launch further 9/11-style attacks against anybody really, but most likely aimed at western countries such as the United States. What Al Qaeda did not count on is President Bush’s determination to defeat them, despite initial missteps or poor decisions, he continues on, changing leaders and strategies when necessary.

And such a change has brought General David Petraeus to the mantle of leading the War in Iraq. He has demonstrated time and again that he learned the lessons of Vietnam. He did so once again when Senator John Kerry cautioned,

“Not since 1967, had a U.S. general played such an important role in making U.S. national-security strategy he said, likening Petraeus' testimony to that of William Westmoreland, the army general who told Congress that things were getting better in Southeast Asia, only for the war in Vietnam to continue for 8 more years.”20

So, when asked if the Iraq war was “making America safer,” his answer? “Sir, I don’t know actually.”21 While the current use of counterinsurgency warfare isn’t the first time that the American public has been exposed to it, the current generation is just learning of the concept and have therefore linked it to the man who updated the book and then took it to Baghdad.

Notes

1. Charles M. Sennott, “The Petraeus Doctrine.” Boston.com, 2007. < http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/01/28/the_petraeus_doctrine/> (January 18, 2008)

2. Ibid.

3. Rachel Dry, “Petraeus on Vietnam’s Legacy.” Washingtonpost.com 2007.

4. Ibid.

5. Vietnam Studies U.S. Army Special Forces 1961-1971, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 1989. Page 3.

6. Greg Jaffe, “As Iraq War Rages, Army Re-Examines Lessons of Vietnam.” The Wall Street Journal (online), 2006.

7. FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency. Headquarters, Department of the Army, December, 2006. Page ix.

8. Ibid, page 1-3.

9. David H. Petraeus, “Lt. Gen. David Petraeus – Interview.” Interviewed by Aaron Lobel and John Haas. September 17, 2006. Page 3. < http://www.americaabroadmedia.org/media/On%20line%20extra%20materials/COIN%20-%20Patreaus%20Intvw.doc>

10. Ibid; and quote attributed to F.E. Adcock (web search)< http://books.google.com/books?id=zNdFW5LIBzgC&pg=PA61&lpg=PA61&dq=%22battles+are+sometimes+won+by+generals+wars+are%22&source=web&ots=CAq3VWzjVm&sig=4nlAF44WlUOc6c98GD2nmWgkUjo&hl=en#PPA61,M1>

11. David H. Petraeus, “A Chat with General David Petraeus.” Interviewed by Rich Lowry. March 29, 2007. Op-For.com. < http://op-for.com/2007/04/a_chat_with_general_david_petr.html>

12. Ibid.

13. FM 3-24, page 2-1.

14. Kristen Williams, “Counterinsurgency 101.” Inthesetimes.com, March 5, 2007. < http://www.inthesetimes.com/article/3056/counterinsurgency_101/>

15. H. D. S. Greenway, “General Petraeus’ ‘Coy Mistress.’” Boston.com, July 31, 2007. < http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/07/31/general_petraeuss_coy_mistress/>

16. Lolita C. Baldor, “Petraeus: U.S. Must Shift to Building Economy.” Armytimes.com, December 31, 2007. < http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/12/ap_petraeus_letter_071228/>

17. Petraeus, David H. “Lifting the Pall: Petraeus on Iraq War.” Interviewed by Ralph Peters July 10, 2007. The New York Post, 2007. < http://www.nypost.com/seven/07102007/postopinion/opedcolumnists/lifting_the_pall_opedcolumnists_ralph_peters.htm?page=0>

18. Edward Morrissey, “Consulting Success.” Captain’s Quarters, November 17, 2007. < http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/016028.php>

19. Jim Kouri. “NY Times: Saddam’s Generals Believed They Had WMD to Repel US.” Renew America, March 13, 2006.

20. “Newsmaker: General David H. Petraeus.” CNN World Weekly, September 14, 2007. < http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/americas/09/13/ww.petraeus.profile/index.html>

21. Ibid.

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Well, what did you think? Worth an A? Worth all the time I've been neglecting the blog?


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